The U.S. men’s national team’s dire September window raised several concerns about the team’s chances heading into the World Cup. It also brought one old question back to the forefront: Is head coach Gregg Berhalter setting the team up in a way that’s a good fit for the players?
In the recent friendly matches against Japan and Saudi Arabia, it certainly didn’t look like it. The U.S. performed brutally in a 2-0 loss to Japan in Dusseldorf, Germany on Sept. 23, committing sloppy turnovers, utterly failing to string together competent attacks and not registering a single shot on goal as they were comprehensively outplayed.
Things got better in a 0-0 draw against Saudi Arabia in Murcia, Spain on Sept. 27, but improving on the awful performance against Japan wasn’t exactly a high bar to clear. The U.S. actually started decently, getting into good positions consistently over the first 20 minutes, but they weren’t able to connect on a final ball. Those promising initial movements mostly dried up for the final 70 minutes. The Americans broke their final full-team camp ahead of Qatar having been shut out in six of their last seven matches against World Cup-bound opponents dating back to January.
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After the Saudi Arabia match, Berhalter and the players struggled to articulate why the U.S. fell off after their decent start. Berhalter cited “a little bit of tightness, a little bit of lack of confidence and anxiety” as reasons for the lack of execution, even though 10 of the 11 starters from the match are near-locks for Qatar.
Midfielder Tyler Adams and center back Walker Zimmerman noted that things looked better in the first half, but both indicated that they don’t think the U.S. has clear enough ideas of how to play through pressure. Christian Pulisic, too, seemed confused why the U.S. didn’t continue playing the way they did in the opening 20 minutes over the remainder of the match.
“I think we made a couple adjustments in the second half that maybe weren’t particularly needed,” he said. “I think we kind of weren’t testing them as much in behind. I thought we had some good runs, some good plays in the first half and there was some good flow, especially down the left side. I didn’t feel that as much in the second half for whatever reason.”
Some of the issues from those lackluster performances could improve if left back Antonee Robinson, winger Tim Weah, midfielder Yunus Musah and center back Chris Richards, all of whom missed the September camp due to injury, return for the World Cup. Robinson, who played over the weekend for Fulham, will provide attacking width and depth down the left and allow Sergiño Dest to stay in his preferred position on the right; Weah, who appeared off the bench on Sunday for Lille, possesses a better final ball than we’ve seen lately from most U.S. attackers; Musah, who also came off the bench for Valencia over the weekend, will add technical ability to the midfield and the capacity to unbalance opponents by carrying the ball forward on the dribble; Richards will bring some much-needed passing skill to the center back position. If they’re healthy, all four of those players will be strong candidates to start against Wales on Nov. 21.
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But the recent struggles and players’ comments about a lack of ideas have sent some folks howling that Berhalter’s system isn’t a good fit for his players. There haven’t, however, been many alternatives proposed. If this isn’t a good fit, which system would work better? Does one exist?
To answer those questions, a clear-eyed analysis of the player pool is required.
The players
Broadly speaking, the U.S. are young and athletic but, as difficult as this may be for some to read, fundamentally lacking in their ability on the ball compared to many teams that will be at the World Cup.
In defense, the center backs are largely untested against top-level strikers. Zimmerman has performed well since he came into the team last October, but his ability to initiate possession out of the back is limited. Richards has the inside track to start alongside him in Qatar, but only if he can return from the injury that sidelined him for the September camp and get a bit of playing time ahead of the World Cup. Cameron Carter-Vickers and Aaron Long are the other main contenders. If either of them start, the U.S. will likely struggle with their distribution from center back. Tim Ream (or even John Brooks) could help solve that, but Berhalter doesn’t appear to consider them athletic enough to play in this team. That could end up as a mistake.
At right back, Dest is wonderfully skilled on the ball and can be a huge asset in attack, but he isn’t a very reliable defender. At left back, Robinson is an excellent athlete, good at getting into the attack and a solid defender. He’s been consistently solid for the U.S. and has plenty of experience against top-level attackers in England. He might not set the World Cup on fire, but he can be trusted to be steady in Qatar. DeAndre Yedlin, Reggie Cannon and Joe Scally are the likely options behind Dest and Robinson.
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The midfielders are athletic, good pressers and, when playing well, can dominate their duels. Adams is a beast defensively, McKennie can be highly disruptive when engaged and Musah has the ability to quickly close down opponents and win balls in crowded central areas.
They are not, however, elite passers. Adams is actually a decent progressor of the ball, but he excels when facing forward and playing quickly; receiving the ball, turning and finding a teammate isn’t his forte. Musah isn’t the best at finding the ball, but the 19-year-old excels at single-handedly breaking pressure by dribbling. McKennie, meanwhile, isn’t all that clean with the ball. He’s at his best when he’s freed from too many responsibilities in buildup and stationed a bit higher up the field, where he can cause havoc with attacking runs, serve as a threat in front of goal, turn opponents over in dangerous positions and not be a liability deeper on the field like he was against Japan, when he looked disinterested and was massively ineffective.
Winger is the U.S.’s strongest position. Pulisic, Weah, Brenden Aaronson and Gio Reyna are all viable options to start when healthy. They’re all a bit different, too.
For all of his talent, Pulisic hasn’t been good for the U.S. for most of the past year. He’s certainly had his moments, but is at his best when playing quickly and simply; staying high, getting the ball facing goal and running at the opponent. Weah has been solid as a classic right winger. He’s got great speed, is good at taking on defenders, strikes the ball reasonably well and delivers a good final pass. Importantly, he stays high and wide, giving the U.S. a threat over the top. Aaronson is actually more comfortable playing centrally than on the wing. He’s not as much of an attacking danger as Weah when he’s out wide, but he’s an incredible presser and good in tight spaces. Reyna, who, like Aaronson, can also play centrally, is the most technically gifted of the bunch. He’s got great vision, hits a good final ball and, as he showed at the Azteca in March, is able to launch off on long, solo, slalom dribbles. Sadly, he’s also missed a ton of time due to hamstring issues. His injury history and the fact that he had to leave the Saudi Arabia match after feeling another twinge in his hamstring mean it might be hard to trust him for anything more than a super-sub role at the World Cup.
Striker is a massive trouble spot. It doesn’t matter who Berhalter has tried. Apart from two games from Ricardo Pepi last fall and a one-off from Jesús Ferreira against massively overmatched Grenada in June, no one has been able to find the net.
Ferreira is smaller and likes to drop deeper than the other options. He can be an outlet in possession and his movement can create space in behind for the U.S. wingers to run into, but he hasn’t been a threat over the top for the U.S. and isn’t really capable of acting as a target. Pepi is bigger than Ferreira, but, at just 19, he isn’t yet physical enough to really offer a huge threat in behind or be an effective target. He does position himself higher than his former FC Dallas teammate and has finally begun to emerge from a year-long rut since he moved to Dutch club Groningen on loan in September, but he didn’t do much to make a case for a roster spot against Saudi Arabia.
Josh Sargent, Jordan Pefok and Brandon Vazquez have different profiles. Sargent isn’t the cleanest on the ball, but he can combine decently with midfielders and wingers, is physical enough to battle opposing center backs and be a viable outlet for long balls, has good movement in the box and is a capable presser. Vazquez is a similar sort of player, though he’s never been called in by Berhalter. Pefok is more of a bruiser; he’s a good target, but he isn’t great at combining with teammates. He is, however, a huge threat in the box, particularly on set pieces and in the air.
The system
Given all of those strengths and weaknesses, it makes sense for the U.S. to center their system of play on pressing, physically dominating the middle of the field and attacking quickly and vertically through their talented wingers. Those ideas emphasize the strengths of the midfielders, provide a measure of protection for the center backs and, in theory, allow the U.S. to run their attack through their very best players on the wing.
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For most of the U.S.’s recent history, this is what Berhalter has tried to do, though it does sometimes seem like he’s hung up on a desire to have the U.S. be more of a possession team than perhaps would be ideal.
Since a pair of bad losses to Mexico and Canada in the fall of 2019, he’s done it primarily out of a single-pivot 4-3-3. Typically, Adams lines up at the base of a midfield triangle with Musah and McKennie playing as dual No. 8s in front of him. The setup has been defensively sound. The Americans can press very effectively out of the formation. The midfielders are capable of dominating their duels and preventing opponents from building through the middle. When they win the ball, they’re often in good positions to quickly play it forward and attack.
Things get bogged down, however, when the U.S. is forced to play through its opponents. The center backs struggle to break lines with their passing, and the U.S. doesn’t have many ball-playing center backs. Adams hasn’t proven capable of progressing play as a lone holder. That can be bypassed if McKennie is as secure and effective with the ball as he was in the U.S.’s 2-0 qualifying win against Mexico last November (probably the best performance of the Berhalter era), but he can’t be relied upon to play that way with any measure of consistency.
Berhalter’s system is also highly reliant on an effective striker. The U.S. can get the ball in dangerous positions on the flanks all they want, but if their main option in the area can’t finish, then it doesn’t really matter.
At this point, there’s little that anyone can do to fix the issues at No. 9. It was confusing that Sargent didn’t get more of an opportunity in September and perplexing that Vazquez hasn’t gotten a chance, but the players who are there simply have to step up.
Some of the other problems — specifically the trouble the U.S. has had progressing the ball through midfield and breaking down compact opponents — can be mitigated with some tweaks.
The tweaks
Midfield shape
As he did in June, Berhalter can change his midfield shape by dropping Musah deeper to play just to the left of Adams and stationing McKennie a little bit higher and to the right of center. Doing so gives Adams and the center backs a valuable additional outlet in possession in Musah, who, as mentioned above, can break the press all by himself with his ability to dribble through players. It also places McKennie in a more natural role further up the field. That’s where he spends most of his time for Juventus; it’s where he’s best. That same position also suits Aaronson, should Berhalter want or need to make a change, which is something he should consider if McKennie performs in Qatar at anywhere near the level he did against Japan.
In June, those changes made the U.S. better at playing through teams without sacrificing much of their ability to win duels in the midfield or press their opponents. Musah was excellent in the deeper role in a 0-0 draw against Uruguay, in particular.
Pulisic’s role
Shifting the midfield also has the potential to make things a little bit easier for Pulisic. The Chelsea attacker is the face of this team; undue expectations have been put on him from the time he was 17. It sometimes feels like that plays out with where he positions himself on the field, with Pulisic often dropping deep in an attempt to try to get on the ball with the U.S., who sometimes haven’t been good enough at finding him.
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His temptation to want to get on the ball and create is understandable, but he’s at his best when he’s driving at defenders on the dribble or arriving into the box to finish a chance. Dropping Musah deeper and shifting McKennie to the right creates more space for Pulisic on the left. He can find pockets between the lines in the half-space or on the sideline. The approach produced good results for Pulisic and the U.S. attack in the 3-0 win against Morocco in June, when it seemed like he was receiving the ball higher up the field and facing defenders more often than usual. The U.S. need to put him in those positions more often. Pulisic neutralizes himself and the U.S. attack when he comes back as far as he did at times against Saudi Arabia. He needs to do a better job of actually staying high and wide where he’s most effective, and the U.S. needs to be more effective at actually getting him the ball in that position. Changing the midfield shape could allow for that.
Striker selection
It could also help to play a striker who can actually stretch the backline or be a target. Against Japan, Ferreira was completely unavailable as a direct option. He continued dropping deep into midfield during his 45-minute shift, which helped allow Japan to stay incredibly compact defensively. This isn’t to say Ferreira can’t succeed for the U.S.; he just needs to play with wingers who can stretch the field and serve as legitimate threats over the top in order for his movement to be maximized. Against Japan, when he played with Reyna and Aaronson, that wasn’t the case.
Things opened up a bit for the U.S. after he was removed at halftime for Sargent, who remained higher, made runs behind the backline and acted as more of a target. But ultimately there is no clear solution for the issues at striker; whoever is playing up there would need to start getting on the end of dangerous balls in the box and actually putting them away for this to work like it really should. The odds of that don’t seem great, no matter who Berhalter selects.
The alternatives
Berhalter himself seems to think that the above tweaks are worthwhile. He tried them in June, then again in the second half of the Japan game. Had Musah been available in September, we probably would have seen a lot more of the adjusted midfield shape in this window. I think we’ll see it in the World Cup, especially against Wales and Iran, when the U.S. should have more of the ball than they will against England.
I’m also of the opinion that those minor tweaks would serve the U.S. better than a more dramatic change to a system with a three-man backline or a shift to some version of a 4-4-2.
Moving to a 3-4-3 or a 3-4-2-1 would mean sacrificing a body in central midfield. Distribution would in theory be better from the center backs (especially if Ream was on the left, Zimmerman central and Richards on the right), but it’d come at the cost of winning balls and disrupting attacks in the center of the park. It’d put Dest and Robinson in good attacking positions, but, as we saw when Berhalter started in a 3-4-2-1 in the Nations League final, that can also mean that center backs are left on islands against rampaging opposing attackers. That’s dangerous. It’d also mean playing with one fewer attacker to add a third player in a center back position that the U.S. is struggling to find two reliable, healthy options. At this stage, that seems foolish.
A 3-5-2 with an Adams, Musah and McKennie midfield and, say, Pulisic and either Weah or Sargent as the forwards would be slightly different. They’d maintain your defensive strength through the middle, but their options going forward would be more limited. Dest and Robinson would be able to station themselves higher up the field, but the U.S. would potentially be removing a talented winger from the lineup and moving another into a less natural role in the center of the field.
Scoring is the issue for the U.S. these days. Would this switch help solve for that?
A 4-2-2-2 is a bit more intriguing to me. You could maintain the current back four, play Adams and Musah in the middle, start McKennie and Aaronson in front of them and use Pulisic and Weah (or one of the more traditional strikers) as the two forwards. The center backs would sometimes be put on islands when the fullbacks are caught up high providing attacking width, but you’d still be robust centrally and able to hit quickly in transition. The real question would come at forward. Pulisic has struggled inside. Weah can play as a No. 9, but he doesn’t get much run there. One of the more traditional strikers could play in this formation, but no one is all that confident in those options. Berhalter would be taking some of his best players — Pulisic and Weah — out of their most dangerous positions on the flanks.
It’s also somewhat understandable why Berhalter didn’t really experiment with these setups before this point. He could have in 2019, when he was focused on building a possession-heavy system that eschewed the long ball before a run of poor results and rough performances prompted him to switch to the system we see today. Even if he had, however, many of the key players on the team now weren’t around for the bulk of that year because they were either not advanced enough in their careers (Reyna, Aaronson, Dest, Pepi, Ferreira, Zimmerman, Robinson, Musah) or too banged up (Adams and Weah). He would have had to implement it later on with the individuals who have since become his core players.
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That couldn’t have happened in 2020, which was almost entirely washed out for the USMNT (they only played four matches; only two involved European-based players) because of the pandemic. 2021 would have been the only real opportunity. And in 2021, the only real time to experiment was during the Gold Cup, to which he brought a more experimental squad than he did for the Nations League finals that preceded it. He had sound logic for that. The European-based players were coming off an exhausting 13-14 months in which they didn’t have a single break. He didn’t want to bring them to a tournament for an additional month just before they were about to begin another grueling season of club competition and World Cup qualifying. He could’ve tried out some new looks and ironed out some of the kinks had he brought his best available team to the Gold Cup, but it’s hard to knock him for his decision not to do so.
Regardless, the general principles that Berhalter has built his team around — press high, win the ball in dangerous positions, dominate duels in midfield and transition quickly through the wings — make sense considering the strengths and weaknesses of the player pool. His roster picks could of course be different. He can make tweaks to the specific system he uses to make the team better, too, perhaps putting greater emphasis on pressing, instructing Pulisic, McKennie and Dest to maintain positional discipline and changing the shape of the midfield by dropping Musah deeper. He began a lot of that process in June. I expect him to continue doing so at the World Cup as long as his main options are healthy enough to start in Qatar.
Berhalter will certainly have an influence on how far the team goes in the World Cup. If he maintains a single-pivot and the U.S. bomb out because they can’t break down compact defenses from Wales and Iran, he will have plenty to answer for.
But he’s dealing with a flawed group of players. They’re young, athletic, skilled and playing at big clubs — that’s exciting. As a unit, however, they struggle to play with the ball. They’re probably in the middle of the pack among World Cup teams in terms of their overall level of talent. No coach in the world — not Berhalter, not Jesse Marsch, not Pep Guardiola — could change that. We should be reasonable with our expectations. No matter the system, fighting through the group, making the knockouts and playing a competitive match in the round of 16 should be seen as acceptable. Anything more would be a good achievement.
(Photo: ANP via Getty Images)
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